The announcement of Hamas and Fatah's reconciliation

With so much left in question about the details of the unity deal, it's hard to tell what it means, and if it will even materialize. It is hard to imagine the Fatah would do something so foolish as to say "good riddance" to the generous US assistance to Fayyad's state-building program, and the gains in peace, freedom of movement, and general prosperity that the PA has reaped from security cooperation with Israel--especially as Hamas's popular support has declined in the past two years

The rhetorical jockeying that is likely to ensue does seem to force a debate and airing of the differences between Fatah and Hamas that needs to happen among Palestinians, and this way is better than they way they've been duking it out over the past few years. We will see who is willing to do what, who will turn out to have been bluffing. Recent (attempted) demonstrations in Gaza and the West Bank, as well the March 2011 public opinion poll by the PCPSR indicates widespread agreement on the priority of reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas. While that may be easy enough to agree upon, there is surely not a consensus at this point as to the actual terms of such a reconciliation. The idea that a panel of "technocrats" can somehow solve fundamental controversies apolitically is absurd.

These are the official terms of the reconciliation:

• The establishment of a government of technocrats instead of the two currently existing governments headed by Salam Fayyad and Ismail Haniyeh.
• The holding of general elections to the parliament and presidency in about eight months.
• A merger and unification of the security apparatuses.
• The release of political prisoners.
• Arab League supervision of the implementation of the agreement.

Analysis from some good journalists and observers of Palestinian and Israeli politics:


"On Reconciliation, ‘The Devil Is In the Details," Interview with Nathan Thrall (International Crisis Group) by Marc Tracy. Tablet Magazine. April 29, 2011.


"Analysis: How to deftly play the Palestinian 'reconciliation' card," Herb Kleinon. Jerusalem Post. April 29, 2011.

"Palestinian Factions Give Different Views of Unity Pact," Ethan Bronner. New York Times. April 28, 2011.

"The Fatah-Hamas Agreement: Analysis and Initial Consequences," Jonathan Halevi. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. April 28, 2011.

"Rival Palestinian factions reach unity agreement," Ibrahim Barzak. With Mohammed Daraghmeh in Ramallah, West Bank, and Diaa Hadid in Cairo, Egypt. Associated Press. April 27, 2011.


See also:
August 10, 2010 report from the Congressional Research Service on,
"US Foreign Aid to the Palestinians." By Jim Zanotti.
Note especially the last paragraph, where the author speculates about the risks to US funding from a possible reconciliation deal that would include Hamas in the Palestinian Authority again.

After Hamas led the PA government for over a year, its forcible takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007 led to the creation of a non-Hamas government in the West Bank—resulting in different models of governance for the two Palestinian territories. Since then, the United States has dramatically boosted aid levels to bolster the PA in the West Bank and President Mahmoud Abbas vis-à-vis Hamas. The United States has appropriated or reprogrammed nearly $2 billion since 2007 in support of PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s security, governance, development, and reform programs, including $650 million for direct budgetary assistance to the PA and nearly $400 million (toward training, non-lethal equipment, facilities, strategic planning, and administration) for strengthening and reforming PA security forces and criminal justice systems in the West Bank. The remainder is for programs administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development and implemented by nongovernmental organizations in humanitarian assistance, economic development, democratic reform, improving water access and other infrastructure, health care, education, and vocational training. In December 2009, Congress approved $500 million in total FY2010 assistance pursuant to P.L. 111-117, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010.

In addition to its bilateral assistance to the Palestinians, the United States is the largest single-state donor to the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which provides food, shelter, medical care, and education for many of the original refugees from the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and their descendants—now comprising approximately 4.8 million Palestinians in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank, and Gaza. Since UNRWA’s inception in 1950, the United States has provided the agency with nearly $4 billion in contributions. U.S. contributions to UNRWA have steadily increased over the past decade, with nearly $228 million thus far for FY2010. Whether UNRWA’s role is beneficial overall, however, is a polarizing question, particularly with respect to UNRWA’s presence in Hamas-controlled Gaza.

The possibility of a consensus or unity government to address the problem of divided rule among Palestinians could lead to a full or partial U.S. aid cutoff if Hamas is included in the government and does not change its stance toward Israel. Even if the immediate objectives of U.S. assistance programs for the Palestinians are met, lack of progress toward a politically legitimate and peaceful two-state solution could undermine the utility of U.S. aid in helping the Palestinians become more cohesive, stable, and self-reliant over the long term. 

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PA daily: "Jews, Jews! Your holiday [Passover] is the Holiday of Apes" - PMW Bulletins

PA daily: "Jews, Jews! Your holiday [Passover] is the Holiday of Apes" - PMW Bulletins

According to a zookeeper at the Safari Park in Israel, chimpanzees do rather enjoy matzoh. so clearly the devoutly anti-Jewish are onto something important here.

[From the Palestinian Authority's official TV channel]

The spring carnival has retained its [Palestinian] flavor in towns such as Bethlehem, Beit Sahour and Ramallah... with the demonstrations of the Scouts, songs, dances, and popular Palestinian hymns about Christian-Islamic unity and internal Christian unity. These hymns carry meaningful messages, in response to the Israeli prohibition [to enter Jerusalem], as seen in the calls of the youth who lead the procession of light, waving swords and not caring if anyone accuses them of anti-Semitism: ... 'Our master, Jesus, the Messiah, the Messiah redeemed us, with his blood he bought us, and today we are joyous while the Jews are sad,' and, 'Jews, Jews! Your holiday is the Holiday of the Apes, while our holiday is the Holiday of the Messiah.'
[PA TV (Fatah), April 11, 2011]



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Goldberg on Goldstone

"The Mysteries of Richard Goldstone," Jeffrey Goldberg @ The Atlantic. April 21, 2011.

Goldberg discusses the recent New York Times piece analyzing the lead-up to Goldstone's publication of his Washington Post op-ed retracting the key claims of the UNHRC report bearing his name.

See also "Past Holds a Clue to Goldstone's Shift on the Gaza War," Ethan Bronner and Jennifer Medina. New York Times. April 19, 2011.

"The Goldstone Report and International Law," Peter Berkowitz. Policy Review No. 162. August 1, 2010.


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Michael Weiss on the incorrigible Hamas apologists in the West

Michael Weiss, "While Hamas turns Gaza into an Islamist state, the Western media praise it for keeping 'law and order." The Telegraph. April 21, 2011.

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Pharoah's heirs and the multifold lessons of the Exodus

Every year around Passover, there are events and circumstances by whose light we can appreciate the enduring relevance of the Exodus story. Still, it's hard not to find this to be especially true in 2011.

Natan Sharansky writes about the rebellions today against modern-day Pharaohs in North Africa and the Middle East, and the challenges they present to those of us blessed to live under free governments. Mindful of the often forgotten follow-up to the escape from Egypt--that heaving off the chains of servitude is merely the first step towards liberty--Sharansky argues that we must strongly put our weight behind those fighting for their political freedom today. The logic of supporting "stable autocracies" is no longer viable, if it ever was. [For an account of why, see Tamara Cofman Wittes' Freedom's Unsteady March.]

"The Stakes in the Middle East," Natan Sharansky. Jewish Review of Books No. 5 (Spring 2011).

No movement toward freedom has succeeded in the blink of an eye, absent a struggle, or without periods when all has seemed lost. In the case of this latest movement, not only has its work barely begun, but it is up against a formidable combination of odds. That is why the next phases are so crucial—and why in my view the nations of the free world must, without delay, seize the moment to lend a hand.

The hard realities of democratic politicking have quickly overtaken the liberal youth movement that toppled Mubarak. This is neither surprising, nor reason to declare the whole thing a failure.
"Struggling to Restart Egypt's Stalled Revolution," Eric Trager. The Atlantic. April 2, 2011.

"Egypt's First Vote," Yasmine el Rashidi. New York Review of Books. March 19, 2011.

"In a Divided Egypt, the Military and Islamists Play for Political Advantage," Eric Trager. The Atlantic. March 18, 2011


Daniel Byman explains just how much it might take to actually topple Qaddafi, and what the potential pitfalls are. President Obama wants to do the right thing on the cheap, and it's not at all clear that the highly circumscribed approach that Obama has laid out is up to the task.
"Libya's Rebels: Approach with Caution," Daniel Byman. Slate. March 31, 2011.
See also a video with Byman, "Libya: Is the U.S. Prepared for a Long-Term Engagement?" March 21, 2011.


Elliott Abrams on why the fake republics of the Middle East and North Africa are more illiberal than the monarchies (see also Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws Books 6, 11, and 12).
"Ridding Syria of a Despot," Op-Ed: Washington Post. March 25, 2011.

Andrew Tabler on what the US can realistically do to undermine Assad.
"Twisting Assad's Arm," Foreign Policy. April 14, 2011.

Itamar Rabinovich, who is probably the most informed and prudent Israeli politician on Syrian matters, explains how the uprising in Syria looks from Jerusalem.
"Israel's Dilemma in Damascus," Foreign Affairs. April 10, 2011.


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Jon Haber on the Tragedy of Goldstone

A very thoughtful analysis by Jon Haber of the ugly bargain Goldstone made

A clue to Goldstone’s decision (some would say his fall) can be seen in his Washington Post mea culpa in which he demonstrates his sincere belief that the goodness, virtue and sound judicial temperament he brought to the situation would mitigate the excesses of what he recognized was starting out as an unjust process. In other words, he was demonstrating what high-school students reading Greek tragedy for the first time would recognize as a “tragic flaw,” in this case, a belief that his own reputation and virtue could transform a corrupt institution (the United Nations and its ghastly so-called Human Rights Council), reforming it in the process into something that would no longer just be an Israel-libel factory but could possibly pave the way to true international justice.

But as he discovered, these forces of corruption were far more interested (and far more able) to co-opt Goldstone’s reputation for their purposes than vice versa. Beyond Goldstone himself, the investigative team was stacked against Israel to a ridiculous degree. Information gathering was shoddy, conclusions drawn from that information were disproportionate and one-sided. And most telling, once the Report was made public, it became the cornerstone of a propaganda war that relied heavily on leveraging Goldstone’s name, Jewishness and reputation to focus the Goldstone Report missile in one and only one direction.

At any point in this process, Goldstone could have resigned and gone public with his criticisms of flaws that could be seen by all before, during and after the investigation and report’s publication. But instead he chose to not only stand firm but to travel the world to defend the accuracy of the work now deeply associated with his name. In other words, the very corrupt institutions he was hoping to change had instead co-opted him to such a degree that he had no choice but to defend what he had done, regardless of the cost to Middle East peace, to his own reputation, and (most significantly) to the cause of international justice he thought he was championing.

In Goldstone’s case, he convinced himself that his virtue and reputation could change a corrupt process and possibly help issue in an era of international justice. But in making a deal with this particular devil, he actually helped turn whatever tools of international justice currently exist (some of which he helped forge) into weapons of war.

Should Goldstone have known better? As noted above, he (unlike most of us) has experience with making personal moral choices that have heavy international consequences. Goldstone will have to deal with the damage to his own reputation due to poor choices on his own (hopefully with a metaphorical Greek chorus in the background alerting him to the tragic consequences of moral vanity). Unfortunately the rest of us will not be able to help him on that journey, busy as we are with cleaning up the wreckage his decisions have caused.

But before leaving Richard Goldstone behind, we should recognize that the compromise he was offered (and took) that led to a tragic fall is something that will likely be offered to all of us at some point in our lives.

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Goldstone retracts criminal accusations against Israel

Goldstone has basically retracted the criminal accusations against Israel in the report bearing his name. If he feels an apology or justification is an order, this is better than nothing. Nonetheless, the accusations of war crimes have already done their damage. In order to achieve the desired effects, the accusations don't need to hold up in an actual court--which Goldstone did clarify his commission was not (rather a "fact-finding" endeavor).  That is the nature of these things. The dirt remains on your face. Accusations stain your reputation whether they are substantiated ultimately or not.

For example, here's how the State Dept's reaction to the op-ed was summarized in the news: "Goldstone affirms US position Israel did not commit war crimes in Gaza."

Certainly, this will not persuade anyone deeply committed to the idea that Israel is a brutal, inhumane people, to whom all Palestinian suffering is to be attributed.  Their judgment of Operation Cast Lead was always based on their opinion of Israel's character more than anything else. What seems most offensive to this crowd is Goldstone's implication that Israeli internal investigations were credible--that such a people could possibly be trusted to scrutinize their own actions and characters. And we are asked believe that a group calling itself the Independent Committee of Experts is more authoritative than the Israel government, because, well, they are called the Independent Committee of Experts.

Others insist that Israel is still terrible and should feel terrible because civilians were killed in the attacks against Hamas. It is an uncomfortable fact that decent nations must sometimes use violence and other forms of coercion to defend themselves, at least in the world we live in.  No amount of lashing out at the bearer of this painful lesson will change that fact. It may well make things worse. Warfare always carries the prospect of the wrong people getting killed. Hamas knows this quite well, and exploits it, with the deserved confidence that important figures abroad will blame Israel and not them.


While it won't circulate and gain traction with nearly among nearly as many as the original report, hopefully there will be some well-meaning but naive internationalists who will be a little more skeptical in the future when there is a fervor to assume the worst of Israeli soldiers (because we all know they are like that) and declare a multilateral commission to bring 'em to justice.

Jon Haber explains the tragic naivete of Goldstone in the face of the task he was invited to take up with the UNHRC.


Here's one rather humorous interpretation of the letter, mocking Goldstone for explaining that he sincerely thought Hamas would investigate its own actions during Cast Lead

Some have also suggested it was absurd to expect the Cookie Monster, a being that has a policy to eat cookies, to investigate what we said were serious crimes against cookies. In the end, asking Cookie Monster to investigate may have been a mistaken enterprise.

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