Analysis of Egyptian mob attack on Israeli embassy in Cairo

Excerpted below:

September 13, 2011. "Mirage," Armin Rosen. Tablet Magazine.
September 13, 2011. "Why Would Israel Give Up Territory After Gaza?" Jeffrey Goldberg @ The Atlantic.
September 12, 2011. "Cairo: Israeli Embassy Attack Planned," Tim Marshall. Sky News.
September 11, 2011. "Egypt's Botched Revolution," Michael Totten @ PJM.
September 10, 2011. "Egypt Troops Save 6 Israelis," Ian Deitch and Diaa Hadid. Time.

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September 13, 2011. "Mirage," Armin Rosen. Tablet Magazine.

While Mubarak incited hostility toward the Jewish State at home, he successfully convinced Israel and the United States that he could uphold Western interests in the region. Ezzedine Fishere, a former Foreign Ministry official at the Egyptian Embassy in Tel Aviv and the secretary general of Egypt’s Supreme Council for Culture, likened Mubarak’s political strategy to riding two horses simultaneously. “You can ride the two horses so long as you’re going straight,” Fishere explained to me. “This is why stability was so important to Mubarak. When there’s instability, the two horses go in opposite directions. Because the public wants you to live up to your commitments, you’ve been feeding this inflammatory discourse about Israel being the source of all evil. … On the other hand, the Israelis are basically your security partners in the region.”

...The military has every reason to preserve Egypt’s treaty with Israel. According to an official familiar with the U.S. government’s operations in Egypt, there are currently “tens of thousands” of American military contractors in Egypt, which still receives over $1.3 billion in annual military aid from the United States. Experts I spoke to in Egypt estimated that the military controls between 20 and 40 percent of the country’s economy. War with Israel serves no obvious strategic purpose for Egypt, and it would probably end American financial assistance, threaten the army’s business holdings, and lead to massive casualties. (Nearly 20,000 Egyptian soldiers were killed in the 1967 and 1973 wars.) 

September 13, 2011. "Why Would Israel Give Up Territory After Gaza?" Jeffrey Goldberg @ The Atlantic. 

 Why, after decades of quiet, has the Egypt-Israel border become so tumultuous? Two reasons: The interim Egyptian government has lost control over the Sinai since the revolution, and Gaza, which borders the Sinai, has been transformed by Hamas into a weapons-importing and terror-exporting mini-state. And how did this come about? Sharon brought this about, by ceding Gaza to the Palestinians.
This is not, by the way, an argument against territorial compromise. Israel's prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, needs to find a creative solution to the problem posed by his country's continued occupation of much of the West Bank. But that job is made much more difficult by Israel's enemies, who choose to ignore Israel's last attempt at giving up territory. And it is made more difficult still by Israeli voters, who, when confronted by demands for further territorial compromise, look to Gaza and say, "Not so fast."

September 12, 2011. "Cairo: Israeli Embassy Attack Planned," Tim Marshall, Sky News. 

The storming of the Israeli Embassy in Cairo on Friday night was not just planned, it was part of a 60 year campaign of hate which has permeated all levels of Egyptian society and which the current chaos in Egypt is allowing full rein...

The teaching of hatred for the 'other' is widespread in Egypt. School books are full of historical innacuracies and holocaust denial. Portions of the Koran which deal with the Jews in a hostile way are promoted. Few politicians can resist the temptation to play to popular appeal and routinely engage in virulently hostile comments not just about Israel but about Jews. These politicians are not just from the Islamic parties, some of the brightest and best of Egyptian liberals also use deeply anti-semitic language.

Every Friday many Immans pour forth abuse against Jews without any official sanction. The mass media also routinely engages in anti-semitism. The Protocols of the Elders of Zion , used to justify slaughter for decades, is a best seller, Hitler's Mein Kampf is popular. The 'Protocols' were serialised as a 24 episode TV series a few years ago and portrayed as fact. In 2002 the number 1 hit in the Egyptian charts was a song about the Jews masterminding 9/11. Newspapers print deeply offensive cartoons which are used across the Arab world. These bigots have their mirror image in some of the wilder fringes of Israeli society; the difference is the views do not appear to be sanctioned at the highest levels, have not permeated the body politic, and are roundly condemned in the Israeli main stream media.

September 11, 2011. "Egypt's Botched Revolution," Michael Totten @ PJM. 

Includes interviews with Egyptian liberals Hala Mustafa and Tarek Heggy.

Hala Mustafa:

Most Western analysts describe Mubarak’s government as an American ally that was at least moderately cooperative with Israel, which is accurate to an extent, but his state-controlled media cranked out vicious anti-American and anti-Israeli propaganda every day for three decades.

...The moment of change hasn’t come yet...It was a premature revolution. Mubarak’s regime wasn’t Mubarak’s. It was the regime that was founded in 1952 and it’s still here. The regime’s attitude against Israel is the same. Americans thought Mubarak was with Israel, but it’s not true. Mubarak did nothing to change the propaganda or advance peace. You have to rethink what was happening.

September 10, 2011. "Egypt Troops Save 6 Israelis," Ian Deitch and Diaa Hadid. Time.

Obama's Middle East Policy Speech May 19, 2011

Walter Russell Mead, "Obama Throws Palestine Under the Bus as World Hails his Courage."
 @The American Interest. May 22, 2011.

Jeffrey Goldberg, "Foxman: Obama Gave a Pro-Israel Speech."
@The Atlantic. May 20, 2011.

Yossi Klein Halevi, "Yes We Can't: An Analysis of Obama's Middle East Speech."  
The New Republic. May 20, 2011.

Matthew Levitt, "Obama Puts the Onus on Hamas, Where It Belongs -- and 1967 Borders, With Swaps, Makes Sense." New York Daily News. May 20, 2011.


Walter Russell Mead, "Obama Embraces his Inner Bush."
@The American Interest. May 19, 2011.

Jeffrey Goldberg, "Why Are Republicans Misreading Obama's Speech?" @The Atlantic. May 19, 2011.

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Al Qaeda after Osama

Daniel Byman knows what he is talking about.

"Osama bin Laden is dead, Al Qaeda isn't," Foreign Policy. May 2, 2011.

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Pharoah's heirs and the multifold lessons of the Exodus

Every year around Passover, there are events and circumstances by whose light we can appreciate the enduring relevance of the Exodus story. Still, it's hard not to find this to be especially true in 2011.

Natan Sharansky writes about the rebellions today against modern-day Pharaohs in North Africa and the Middle East, and the challenges they present to those of us blessed to live under free governments. Mindful of the often forgotten follow-up to the escape from Egypt--that heaving off the chains of servitude is merely the first step towards liberty--Sharansky argues that we must strongly put our weight behind those fighting for their political freedom today. The logic of supporting "stable autocracies" is no longer viable, if it ever was. [For an account of why, see Tamara Cofman Wittes' Freedom's Unsteady March.]

"The Stakes in the Middle East," Natan Sharansky. Jewish Review of Books No. 5 (Spring 2011).

No movement toward freedom has succeeded in the blink of an eye, absent a struggle, or without periods when all has seemed lost. In the case of this latest movement, not only has its work barely begun, but it is up against a formidable combination of odds. That is why the next phases are so crucial—and why in my view the nations of the free world must, without delay, seize the moment to lend a hand.

The hard realities of democratic politicking have quickly overtaken the liberal youth movement that toppled Mubarak. This is neither surprising, nor reason to declare the whole thing a failure.
"Struggling to Restart Egypt's Stalled Revolution," Eric Trager. The Atlantic. April 2, 2011.

"Egypt's First Vote," Yasmine el Rashidi. New York Review of Books. March 19, 2011.

"In a Divided Egypt, the Military and Islamists Play for Political Advantage," Eric Trager. The Atlantic. March 18, 2011


Daniel Byman explains just how much it might take to actually topple Qaddafi, and what the potential pitfalls are. President Obama wants to do the right thing on the cheap, and it's not at all clear that the highly circumscribed approach that Obama has laid out is up to the task.
"Libya's Rebels: Approach with Caution," Daniel Byman. Slate. March 31, 2011.
See also a video with Byman, "Libya: Is the U.S. Prepared for a Long-Term Engagement?" March 21, 2011.


Elliott Abrams on why the fake republics of the Middle East and North Africa are more illiberal than the monarchies (see also Montesquieu's Spirit of the Laws Books 6, 11, and 12).
"Ridding Syria of a Despot," Op-Ed: Washington Post. March 25, 2011.

Andrew Tabler on what the US can realistically do to undermine Assad.
"Twisting Assad's Arm," Foreign Policy. April 14, 2011.

Itamar Rabinovich, who is probably the most informed and prudent Israeli politician on Syrian matters, explains how the uprising in Syria looks from Jerusalem.
"Israel's Dilemma in Damascus," Foreign Affairs. April 10, 2011.


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How Obama Turned on a Dime

Josh Rogin, :How Obama turned on a dime toward war" Foreign Policy. March 18, 2011.

"This is the greatest opportunity to realign our interests and our values," a senior administration official said at the meeting, telling the experts this sentence came from Obama himself.

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Standing by while Libya burns

Last Friday, Obama claimed that he is "tightening the noose" around Qadhafi. Really? All evidence suggests that Qadhafi and his mercenaries are actually doing the tightening--around the last opposition stronghold in Benghazi.  Not only are we failing to aid this courageous uprising against a brutal thug, failing to assert our interests and values in this changing Middle Eastern landscape, but our president has shown his word means nothing. He has declared which side we are on, called for Qadhafi to go, but not followed through in any substantive way. This will not go unnoticed.  As Larry Diamond puts it, "If Barack Obama cannot face down a modest thug who is hated by most of his own people and by every neighboring government, who can he confront anywhere?"

Leon Wieseltier weighs in with one of the most powerful critiques of Obama's handling of the would-be Libyan revolution ("Darkness," The New Republic Online. March 11, 2011). [See excerpt below]

Fareed Zakaria explains why American interests are at stake in the outcome in Libya ("The Libyan Conundrum," Time. March 10, 2011).

Larry Diamond argues that Libya is our business first and foremost because Obama has made it clear where the U.S. stands, and not backing up its words with action sends a dangerous signal. ("Obama's Moment of Truth," The New Republic. March 15, 2011)

Hussein Ibish, who has been calling for strong American action from the beginning of the uprising, wonders whether the window of opportunity might have already passed. ("Can a No-Fly Zone Still Fly Today? Now Lebanon. March 15, 2011).

Michael Totten contends that Arabs bear a large responsibility for American hesitation to assert itself against Qadhafi.  ("What About Our Hearts and Minds?" New York Sun. March 14, 2011).

Wieseltier writes:

We will not act to prevent a crime against humanity because by doing so we will offend—who, exactly? Not the Libyans who are clamoring for Western assistance, or the Egyptians who looked to us for unequivocal support in their fight for freedom, or the Iranians who made a similar mistake. No, we will offend only a certain doctrinaire Western notion of what the contemporary Arab world thinks about the West, a notion that the democratic upheavals in the Arab world are making manifestly obsolete. We will offend not their assumptions, but our assumptions about their assumptions...

[Obama] declares that Qaddafi must go and that we will stand with the Libyan people, and then he does nothing. No, that’s not right. He consults and consults, and his staff works round the clock, and economic sanctions are instituted against the rampaging dictator who has tens of billions of dollars in cash. Obama is prepared to act, just not consequentially. He does not want the responsibility for any Arab outcome. He says they must do it for themselves. But they are doing it for themselves. They merely need help. And the help they need is easy for us to provide. (Jam their fucking communications.) And their cause is freedom, which is allegedly our cause. What they seek from Obama is an extended hand. What they are getting is a clenched fist. If Muammar Qaddafi takes Benghazi, it will be Barack Obama’s responsibility. That is what it means to be the American president. The American president cannot but affect the outcome. That is his burden and his privilege. He has the power to stop such an atrocity, so if the atrocity is not stopped it will be because he chose not to use his power. Perhaps that is why Obama has been telling people, rather tastelessly, that it would be easier to be the president of China. Obama will not be rushed. He is a man of the long game. But the Libyan struggle for freedom, and the mission of rescue, is a short game. That is the temporality of such circumstances. If you do not act swiftly, you have misunderstood the situation. Delay means disaster. Does Obama have any idea of what Qaddafi’s victory will mean for the region and its awakening?

 
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On Obama administration's clumsy UNSC diplomacy

Elliott Abrams puts it quite well:

"How to Lose Friends and Not Influence People," Elliott Abrams. Council on Foreign Relations Blog. Feb. 18, 2011.

 The Obama Administration cast its first veto in the United Nations on Friday, February 18, killing a Security Council resolution that would have condemned Israeli settlement activity.  Its poor handling of the entire episode has left just about everyone angry at the United States , and is therefore a manifest failure of American diplomacy.

The Palestinian Authority began to talk about this resolution months ago.  The United States could then have adopted a clear position: put it forward and it will be vetoed.  That very clear stand might have persuaded the Palestinian leaders and their Arab supporters to drop the effort early on, when it could have been abandoned with no loss of face.  Instead the Administration refused to make its position clear until the final day. In its Friday edition the New York Times was reporting that “the Obama administration was trying Thursday evening to head off an imminent vote in the United Nations Security Council that would declare Israel’s settlement construction in the West Bank illegal, but would not declare publicly whether it was prepared to veto the resolution.”  It seems clear that the Administration was desperate to avoid a veto, indeed desperate to go four years without spoiling its “perfect record.”  But a “perfect record” in the UN requires vetoes, given the persistent anti-Israel bias of the organization.  The Administration’s desire to avoid vetoes only served to reduce its bargaining power, for the credible threat of a veto has long served American diplomats seeking to achieve an outcome more favorable to our interests.

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Egypt Post-Mubarak

First installment: Civil-Military Relations

Questions on my mind: how helpful are European and American views of what constitutes "healthy civil-military relations" in approaching Egypt? Some have argued that the EU's standard demands for civilian control over the military have, in the case of would-be member Turkey, facilitated Erdogan and the ruling AKP to consolidate their power in disconcerting ways.

From the little I know, it seems that civil-military relations in Egypt are in some ways at least sui generis. What are the most important ways in which this is the case?

What does it mean that Egyptian military officers apparently have important commercial holdings and have an major stake in the Egyptian economy? This seems to be something rather different from the "military-industrial complex" that we speak of in the US.


A helpful summary and analysis of the debate from the good folks at Tablet Magazine:
Marc Tracy. "Egypt's 'Democratic Transtion' Begins: Can martial law lead to the ballot box?"
Feb. 14, 2011.


Steven Cook, "Egyptian Military's Moment of Truth." Council of Foreign Relations Blog. February 12, 2011.


"Will Egypt's Army Be a Change Agent or Maintain Status Quo?" PBS Newshour. Feb. 8, 2011.
With Matthew Axelrod and Shibley Telhami.

Matthew Axelrod, "The Egyptian Military Calculus." Foreign Policy. Jan. 31, 2011.

Military officers share the Egyptian people's frustration with the Mubarak regime. As a Fulbright Fellow in Egypt researching the U.S.-Egypt strategic relationship, I interviewed active and retired military officers who expressed resentment that military courts were being used to prosecute the regime's political enemies. They were also quick to distance themselves from the Ministry of Interior and lament the brutal tactics of the Central Security Forces. They indicated that the situation was unlikely to improve under the current political leadership.

But the military was not supposed to get involved. Presidents Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak isolated the armed forces from domestic affairs to prevent prominent officers from emerging as political rivals. This isolation has made the military an infrequent but critical player in Egyptian politics. Because it enters the fray only in times of crisis, and then in a "national guard" capacity, it maintains great credibility with the Egyptian people. Ironically, by withdrawing from politics, the military now is in a position to usher in new political leadership.

However, doing so comes at personal financial risk. Senior military officers are believed to benefit handsomely from the revenues generated by military-owned corporations, private contracts with foreign companies, and post-retirement postings in the private and public sectors. General Ahmed Mohamed Shafik, former head of Civil Aviation and now Egypt's new Prime Minister, is the most prominent example. During my research in Cairo, foreign diplomats told me that Egyptian military officers regularly supplemented their incomes by receiving cash for routine military services, including Suez Canal passage. Some of those funds are believed to be held in Switzerland, where General Magdy Galal Sharawi, head of Egypt's Air Force from 2002-2008, currently serves as Ambassador.  An accurate calculation of these activities is difficult to quantify, but they are systemic. We can assume that military officers are thinking about how the current crisis might affect their own livelihoods.

There is a tension between the military's interests -- maintaining its credibility by siding with the people on the one hand, and maintaining its vast economic apparatus on the other.

Steven Cook, "Five Things You Need to Know About the Egyptian Military." Council on Foreign Relations Blog. January 31, 2011.

Books I wish I had time to read:
Steven Cook, Ruling but not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2007. 

Security Sector Transformation in Southeastern Europe and the Middle East. Ed. Thanos Dokos. Proceedings of NATO Advanced Research Workshops on Security Sector Transformation in Southeastern Europe and the Mediterranean 2004-2005. Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2007. Includes "Civil-Military Relations in Egypt: An Overview," Obaida El-Dandarawy. 


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